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The declaration ending the Malayan Emergency on 30 June 1960 
did not mark the end of the Communist Party of Malaya’s (CPM) 
objective of making Peninsular Malaysia a Democratic Republic of 
Malaya. In addition to this continued threat, the British withdrew 
their military forces from Malaysia in 1967, leaving the nation to fend 
for itself from both internal and external threats. This situation led 
the government to strengthen its Security Forces (SF) and military 
assets. One of the air assets acquired was the medium lift helicopters, 
Sikorsky S61A-4 Nuri. The capabilities of these aircraft in providing 
air movement of the troops and supplies made the SF dominate over 
the CTs. The insurrection of the communist insurgency coincided with 
the introduction of the Nuri in 1968 where its foreseeable roles were 
demonstrated during the numerous operations launched by the SF in 
Peninsular Malaysia (1968-1989). This paper aims to highlight the 
involvement of the Nuri in Op Gubir 11 (a Unilateral Operation), 
Op Selamat Sawadee (Combined Operation between Malaysia and 
Thailand), and Op Bamboo with emphasis on Search and Rescue 
(SAR) operations. It also discussed the threats and challenges 
faced by the Nuri crew while operating in hostile and challenging 
environments. The admirable performance of these workhorses was a 
contributing towards for the eventual signing of the Peace Agreement 
between Malaysia and the CPM at Hat Yai, Thailand, on 2 December 
1989. Also it’s uses the historical approach and most of the references 
are based on interview with SF’s personnel and the records of Nuri’s 
ex-pilots.  
Keywords: Malayan Emergency, Communist Party of Malaya, Sikorsky S61A-
Nuri, Communist Insurgency and Hat Yai Peace Agreement.
 “…Without the enormous support from the helicopter force, we in all 
likelihood would still be fighting the communists in the jungle”…Lt 
Gen Tan Sri Mohamed Bin Ngah Said RMAF (Retired), former Chief 
Of Air Force.
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Introduction
Counterinsurgency, defined as “…Those military, law enforcement, political, 
economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while 
addressing the causes”,3 in Malaysia had its genesis during the Malayan 
Emergency (1948-60). This action was taken by the government in response 
to the militant actions of the Communist Party  Of  Malaya (CPM) in their 
attempt to establish the Democratic Republic Of Malaya.4 As a result, the CTs 
retreated to the southern border of Thailand by the end of 1960, marking the 
end of the Emergency. However, in his declaration on 29 July 1960, the King 
reminded the nation “…against the danger from subversive elements which 
“still seek to set up a Communist regime in our country””.5 This reminder was 
in line with the CPM’s propaganda  which proclaimed “…that the failure of its 
struggle was not a defeat but a ‘strategic retreat’ – a withdrawal to re-group 
and to reorganise its forces”.6 To them, the period of 1960-1968 was “…a 
period of streamlining and indoctrination”,7  while waiting for the opportune 
moment to launch its armed struggle in the pursuit of its objective. 
It was during the Emergency that the vertical take-off/landing 
flying machine of the Royal Air Force (RAF), helicopter, made its debut in 
Malaysia. The presence of this unique instrument of war  “…had been largely 
responsible for carrying the offensive to the terrorists’ jungle hideouts, a major 
factor in the ultimate defeat, and finally became established as an essential 
element in fighting the guerrilla kind of war”.8 Realising the importance of 
the helicopters in counterinsurgency warfare (COIN),  Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
the Prime Minister, announced the procurement of US-made medium lift 
helicopters, Sikorsky S61 Sea King9  on 30 October 1966. According to 
him, “…the Sikorsky helicopters were found to be the most suitable as they 
could carry more people and were very effective for jungle warfare”.10 Under 
normal circumstances, this helicopter could offer a maximum payload of 30 
passengers, carry external load of 4,000 lbs, and endurance of six hours flying 
time. These capabilities made this aircraft the ideal choice in providing air 
mobility support in COIN warfare, casualty evacuation, and SAR operations. 
A total of 43 Sikorsky S61A-4 Nuris, popularly known as the  ‘Iron Bird’ to the 
members of the Security Forces (SF), were procured by the Royal Malaysian 
Air Force (RMAF).11The first arrival was in January 196812and the 43rd on 31 
January 1978.13 
Malaysia’s Security Circumtances 
Besides the threats from the CPM in the Peninsular Malaysia, the nation was 
also facing the communist insurgency threat in Sarawak. In the White Paper, 
“The Communist Threat To Sarawak”, the government stressed that “…the 
Sarawak Communist Organisation [SCO] has successfully penetrated almost 
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the entire fabric of Sarawak society – from the political field, through those 
of the labour and peasantry, right down to student level”.14 During the period 
between 1967 and 1972, the SCO had killed 77 policemen and civilians in 
the Rajang Basin alone.15To combat these militant threats, the government 
established the Rajang Security Command (RASCOM) on 1 April 197216 
whose objective was “...To deal with the threat from the Communists and to 
ensure that the Government machinery is fully geared and mobilised towards 
this objective”.17 
On the international front, relationship with the Philippines deteriorated 
when President Diasdado Macapagal  of the Philippines announced in the 
Congress of the Philippines claiming sovereignty over Sabah on 28 January 
1963.18  This tense situation reached its climax when his successor, President 
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos), signed the Senate Bill No. 954, also known as 
“Sabah Bill”, on 18 September 1968. According to Marcos, the Bill “...restates 
the long-held well-known Philippine official position that the Republic has 
acquired sovereignty and dominion over the territory of Sabah in accordance 
with a series of events, acts, agreements and transactions, including the Deed 
of Cession from the Sultan of Sulu of 1962 to the Philippines”.19The Malaysian 
government retaliated by recalling its ambassador.20
The need to increase security became more demanding with the 
withdrawal of the British troops from Malaysia in 196721  which led to 
the termination of Anglo-Malaysia Defence Agreement (AMDA).22 This 
Agreement was replaced with the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 
whose signatories were Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and 
United Kingdom.23 Under these Arrangements, the signatories “...declared, in 
relation to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the event 
of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported or the threat 
of such attack against Malaysia and Singapore, their Governments would 
immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures 
should be take jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat”.24In his 
speech, Tun Abdul Razak, the Prime Minister, stated that “…We accept that 
the primary responsibility for our defence rests and must rest with us”.25 
Nuri and Security Challenges 
With these turn of events, Malaysia, as a sovereign nation, had to strengthen 
its security forces (SF), i.e., the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and the 
Royal Malaysian Police (RMP). The choice of the Sikorsky S61A-4 took into 
consideration of SF operational requirements in enhancing “…the mobility of 
the troops in their counter-insurgency operations and for supply mission”.26 
In addition to its capabilities mentioned earlier, this aircraft could easily 
transport a minimum of an infantry section of 12 battle-equipped men or airlift 
a Howitzer 105mm gun to gun positions deep in the jungle without the need to 
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disassemble and reassemble them.  The first 10 Malaysian version helicopters, 
S61A-4, entered the stable of the RMAF aircraft inventory in 1968. The reliable 
performance of these workhorses in supporting the numerous operations 
launched by the SF against the enemies led to the additional procurement 
totalling 43 aircraft by 1978,27 including a replacement of a Nuri that crashed 
on 12 March 197228. 
The presence of the Nuri, as an instrument of war in COIN warfare in 
Peninsular Malaysia, coincided with the insurrection of the armed aggression 
by the CPM. After a consolidation period of six years in southern Thailand 
since 1960, the communist terrorists (CTs) re-launched its military activities 
against the nation. The re-launching was marked  by an ambush of a Police 
Field Force (PFF) convoy. On 17 June 1968, the convoy en route from Kroh 
(Pangkalan Hulu), Perak, to Betong, Thailand, was ambushed which wounded 
and killed 16 members of the PFF respectively.29Before first light the next day, 
18 June, two Nuris were airborne from Kuantan Base for Kroh for casevac/
bodevac mission.30Major Peter Wong K.C., the co-pilot of one of the Nuris 
involved in this mission, quipped:31
“…No flight jackets nor armour plated seats then. We were literally 
sitting ducks. Probably the communist terrorists went for breakfast. 
So we were spared from harm. That day was perhaps the start of a 
long day for the nuris as we logged a total of 7 hours 10 minutes. That 
day also gave the security forces a morale and psychological boost 
knowing that assistance was never too far away”.
Unlike helicopter operations during the Emergency where RAF 
helicopters were not made the target, the Nuri aircrew faced the threat from the 
CTs who were trained at shooting down helicopters.32This skill was exhibited 
when a Nuri was shot during final approach to land at a landing point (LP) 
in Sadao, Thailand, on 6 August 1969.33 The shooting hit the captain’s seat 
and damaged two radio sets and a main rotor blade. The immediate action 
of the captain was to execute an overshoot and the aircraft landed safely at 
Changlon.34 This shooting incident led the RMAF to replace both the pilot 
seats with their mounting plates and the lower observation windows in the 
cockpit with bullet-proof materials.  Additional safety measures taken were 
the requirement of Alouette 111 gunship escort for the Nuri and a placement 
of two members of the Air Rescue Team (ART) from the commando unit on 
board the Nuri during certain operations, such as Op Gubir 11 and Op Selamat 
Sawadee. The second shooting incident took place at the Weng operation area, 
Kedah Darulaman, on 22 December 1974. In this incident, two members of the 
7 Ranger Regiment were wounded during clashes with the CTs at two different 
locations. Initially an Alouette 111 from Butterworth Base was tasked for this 
casevac mission. However, the Alouette 111 was unable to do it   since the 
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height of the trees exceeded the length of the hoist’s cable. 
A Nuri was then tasked to perform this mission. The Nuri, captained 
by Capt (Air) Abdul Rahim Bin Abdul Rahman, with his crew, Lt (Air) Mohd 
Nordin Bin Mohd Kasim and Sgt Augustine (Air Quartermasters [AQM]),35took 
off from RMAF Base, Kuantan, late in the afternoon.36 After about one hour 
and 30 minutes of flight time, they reached the first location and managed to 
winch up the casualty. They then proceeded to the second location and was 
hovering over the area at about 1730 hours. While winching up the casualty, 
the Nuri was shot by the CTs and a bullet grazed the captain’s leg. The captain 
could not transit forward immediately since the casualty was still below the 
jungle canopy. Only when the casualty cleared the canopy, the captain took off 
with the casualty still hanging outside the aircraft, and simultaneously being 
pulled by the AQM into the aircraft. The Nuri landed at a school football field, 
Kampung Sungai Pari, Weng, where the casualty was transferred to an Alouette 
111 and flown to the Penang hospital. On inspection, one of the three fuel tanks 
of the aircraft was hit. The Nuri had to night stop at the location before being 
flown to Butterworth the next day after the engineering personnel cleared the 
aircraft safe for the ferry flight.  
The shooting spree continued during a special operation, Op Gubir 
11, launched by the Army in the Op Kota37 operation areas of Gubir, Kedah 
Darulaman, on 15 April 1976. The mission of this operation was to capture a 
CTs’ training camp, code-named ‘Target Bravo’, with a network of tunnels, 
near the Malaysia-Thai border. The execution of the operation had to be done 
through airborne assault since the camp was planted with booby traps. Three 
Nuris were deployed to provide air mobility for the insertion and extraction of 
the commandos in and out of Target Bravo and also the cordon and cut-off party. 
Before the insertion, artillery fire followed by offensive air support by fighter 
aircraft, F5E and CL-41G Tebuan, bombarded the camp and its surrounding 
areas to neutralize the enemies on 17 April 1976.38 This was followed by 
two Alouette 111 gunships strafing the area. After the firing had ceased, the 
Nuris were cleared to make an approach to hover at the camp. The first Nuri 
was shot by the CTs while hovering with the commandos in the process of 
abseiling  down into the camp.39  Three commandos were wounded40 and the 
Nuri sustained 49 rounds of ammunition hitting the fuel tanks. The sortie was 
aborted and all the Nuris flew back to Gubir. According to Lt Col Mior Zubir 
Bin Mior Yahya RMAF (Retired), the flight leader, who was escorting the Nuri, 
“…I was following very closely behind him and I could see the fuel – our fuel 
tank was in the belly of the aircraft – I could see fuel coming down like rain”.41 
This hostile action had the Brigade Commander, 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade 
(6 MIB), to  reschedule the insertion of the troops into the camp  to a later date 
while the insertion of the cordon and cut-off party was done later in the day.42 
The new D-Day for the insertion of the commandos into Target 
Bravo was set on 21 April 197643 and the insertion was successfully carried 
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out although a Nuri came under enemies’ fire while the commandos were 
being winched down.44 The capture of the camp was not without casualties. 
On the first day of the landing of the troops, three commandos became victims 
of booby traps. They were immediately evacuated and flown to Alor Setar 
hospital. However, this operation marked the blackest day in the history of the 
RMAF, in particular, and the nation, in general, when a Nuri was shot by the 
CTs while on the final to land at the camp on 26 April 1976. The captain of the 
aircraft executed an overshoot but unfortunately it crashed on the flight back 
to  Gubir, killing all the 11 persons on board.45The operation ended on 1 May 
1976 and the troops were extracted out.46This operation rendered the enemies’ 
camp no longer habitable by the CTs47but there was also sorrow for the crew 
of the helicopter force as expressed by Brig Gen Dato’ Goh Seng Toh RMAF 
(Retired) “…I went through the saddest and scary part of my life during Ops 
Gubir”.48 
Operations between Malaysia-Thailand
The CTs hostile actions against the Nuri became more aggressive  during 
the Combined Operation between the SF of Malaysia and Thailand, Op 
Selamat Sawadee, April 24, 1978 to July 5, 1980, in Betong area of southern 
Thailand and Banding in northern Perak.1 The concept of the operation was 
“…the systematic deployments of patrols during the day and mounting night 
ambushes at suspected trails crossings or rest sites within a 1,000 metre-radius 
for the SF jungle base camps”.50 The deployment of the troops, guns, rations, 
ammunitions, leaflets drop urging the CTs to surrender,51  to the operation areas 
were performed by the Nuris. One Nuri and two gunships were stationed at 
Kroh, the location of  the Combined Task Force HQ, during the peak of the 
operation. 
In one instance, the shooting spree lasted for four consecutive days. 
The first incident was on 13 August 1978. The Nuri was on the approach to 
land at the landing point (LP) with an underslung load of artillery ammunitions 
when it was shot. The captain of the Nuri abandoned the landing and overshoot 
for Kroh.52The next day, 14 August, a Nuri was shot while the Nuri was on the 
ground at the LP.53 A bullet hit the AQM, Sgt Patrick Lee, on his left upper 
hand resulting with permanent lingering ache to this day. He quipped, “…I 
heard a cracking sound because my Cross pen was broken into two. Bloody 
CTs were very accurate”.54 The following day, 15 August, on taking off from 
an LP after picking up two bodies of the SF, the Nuri was shot.55 The next day, 
16 August, while hovering to land at an LP to pick up a casualty, the aircraft 
was shot at, killing a member of the ART, L/Cpl Ismail Bin Ahmad.56 The 
captain executed an immediate take-off without taking the casualty at the LP. 
The aircraft sustained damages to a main rotor blade, the wind screen, and 
also hit the captain’s flying suit. A second attempt was made to bring back the 
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casualty on 17 August. Before the Nuri departed for the LP, artillery provided 
fire support followed by offensive air support by F5E and CL-41G Tebuan 
fighters.57 Before the Nuri landed, gunship strafed the approach route of the 
Nuri. This combat SAR to save the life of an injured soldier was highlighted 
by Lt Col Frank Chong Keng Lay RMAF (Retired):58
“...This is very important as the Nuri pilot must get the job done 
lest the morale of the ground troops be severely affected. They 
will not give their 110 per cent to the operations at hand. There is 
nothing worse than a commander on the ground be he a platoon 
commander, company commander or a battalion commander, to have 
a demoralized unit because his wounded comrade is not extricated 
for medical treatment; it can happen to him and be faced with the 
same situation and be left in the battle front uncared.”
In meeting the concept of night-ambush, the Nuri was also to perform 
casevac missions at night. This night mission posed a problem to the aircrew 
since the Nuri was fitted with only basic navigational equipment, namely 
the Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) and standby compass. There was no 
weather radar nor Global Positioning System (GPS) which could greatly assist 
the pilots.   In one incident, a Nuri was tasked for a casevac mission involving 
a commando who was injured due to booby traps. The Nuri was airborne from 
Kroh past 2000 hours in the pitch darkness of the night. As the aircraft was 
approaching the general location, contact was made through radio with the 
ground troops. According to Maj Musa Bin Hassan, the aircraft captain, “…
We asked them to fire RED very to enable us to locate the rough position and 
it was exactly at our 12 o’clock position, some distance in front”.59The troops 
responded by firing several shots which made the co-pilot, 2nd Lt  Mohamed 
Mansor Bin Md Zain, to comment “…Musa remarked the night was like 
Raya…so bright were the flares”.60 While hovering, Maj Musa faced a dilemma 
whether to switch on the flood and hover lights of the aircraft. According to 
him, “…They  were below me, BUT the terrorists were also within the vicinity. 
We could end up dead if we got shot down BUT at the same time we could NOT 
see the troops below us without the lights”.612 He chose to switch on the lights. 
The casualty was flown to Alor Setar hospital and the crew night stopped at 
Alor Setar. 
The threats by the CTs, however, did not deter the aircrew from 
performing their responsibilities. Under certain circumstances, the pilots had 
to adopt Nap-Of-The-Earth (NOE) flight mode which “…entails flying as near 
the ground as possible, within the limits of flying safety, thus making use of 
all available cover and defilade and keeping exposure time to an absolute 
minimum”62to survive. This technique challenges the proficiency of the flying 
and adjustment skills of the pilots. However, this mode of flying was not 
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feasible with an underslung load due to speed limitations. 
Op Selamat Sawadee was a success when it was reported that the 
CTs were faced with “…logistical problems, but also put a constraint on its 
intelligence resources. These set-backs had a very lasting adverse effect even 
long after combined operations were over”.633 This was in addition to a number 
of them being killed. The roles played by the Nuris during this operation 
were summed up by Brig Gen Dato’ Sharif Hidayat (Retired) “…Nuris were 
extremely important in executing operational task such as casevac, troops 
deployment, and logistic resupply”.644
Challenges in 1968-1989
Throughout  this period (1968-1989), the Nuri performed admirably as a 
platform for SAR. This was displayed in two separate helicopter crashes in Op 
Bamboo area. The operation area covered was “...bounded by the Perak River 
from its source at the Malaysia-Thai border to the Kuala Kangsar/Sungai Siput 
North district boundary. It then ran along the district boundary eastwards to 
the Perak/Kelantan State border”.65 The objectives of Op Bamboo which was 
launched in October 1959 were:66
a) Eliminating the 12TH REGIMENT ASAL ORGANISATION
b) Bringing all the aborigines in the area both hostile, and  otherwise 
under control of the Government, and obtaining their  complete 
 co-operation”.
This operation was fully entrusted to the RMP through the Senoi 
Praaq of the PFF and the Special Branch (SB) while the police commandos, 
VAT 69, were deployed for special operations launched in the area. The Senoi 
Praaq and the SB were stationed at the numerous forts/posts deep in “…the 
most difficult and inaccessible jungle in the world.”67 MAF elements involved 
were the air assets, namely the Caribou, Nuri and Alouette 111, and the Air 
Despatch (AD) unit of Malaysian Service Corp. The Nuri was the primary 
platform for the deployment of the troops as well as for the resupply missions, 
into the forts/posts while the Alouette 111 as the platform for Flying Doctor 
Services for the Orang Asli. AD was responsible in preparing the supplies for 
air drops by the Caribou. 
Although the Nuri was free from hostile enemy fire when operating 
in Op Bamboo, it nevertheless had to face a different kind of challenge in 
the form of thick cumulous nimbus clouds and heavy rain due to orographic 
effect.68 The bad weather condition led to an Alouette 111 from No 3 Squadron, 
RMAF Butterworth, being reported missing on 8 February 1977 while on 
Flying Doctor Services mission with five persons on board. The aircraft failed 
to land at Ipoh after it was airborne from Fort Chabai at about 1830 hours. 
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SAR operation was launched immediately. The next day, 9 February, two 
survivors managed to walk to Post Dakoh at about 1500 hours from the crash 
site of about 5,000 feet.69 Despite the general area of the crash site was known, 
Nuri could only manage to winch up the three bodies on 13 February.70The 
delay was due to the weather  condition which was described by Capt Sharif 
Bin Abas, “…We knew the whereabouts of the crash area but could not reach 
it due to clouds plus heavy and strong wind! Even after the 2 crash victims 
reached Post Dakoh, we had trouble to reach the crash site until the weather 
window opened up”.71 This statement was endorsed by Gen Tan Sri Abdullah 
Bin Ahmad RMAF (Retired),  “…bad weather everyday, crash site was fully 
covered with low cloud and it was raining non-stop. I couldn’t go to the crash 
site though tried hard many times”.72 
The second crash involved a Nuri from No 10 Squadron, RMAF 
Kuala Lumpur, on 8 November 1989. This insident, however, was without 
the benefit of any survivor to give the indication of the general area of the 
crash site. On the fateful day, the Nuri with 21 persons on board failed to 
land at Lasah, Sungai Siput, at the estimated time of arrival of 1100 hour after 
airborne from Post Gemala.73 SAR operation was immediately launched. As 
experienced by the aircrew of the SAR operation earlier,  Maj Tengku Malek 
Bin Tengku Baharum had this to say about the weather:74
 “…it was impossible to look for any sign since the whole area was 
covered with thick cloud. The only area not covered was the peak of 
Gunung Gerah. We flew past the area and orbited it, spending at least 
30 to 45 minutes looking for sign. Unfortunately the primary forest 
with thick jungle made detection difficult using naked eyes”. 
The wreckage was only located on 12 November at 6,000 feet on 
the slope of Gunung Gerah.755 WO1 Pak Singh (Retired) who was winched 
down at the crash site, described the scene, “…All bodies were burnt but 
partially intact, no clothes and some had their legs missing. I could recognise 
Zainudin [AQM] as his remains were hardened by the cold weather up on the 
hill Gunung Gerah. We picked every part of the bodies and named who could 
be recognised”.76Apart from these two incidents, the contributions of the Nuris 
in providing air mobility to support the troops operating in Op Bamboo were 
expressed by ASP Francis (Retired), “…Nuri had done a good job for me and 
my men sending us deep into the border area. We, the PDRM, appreciated the 
work done by the Nuri. It is one of the best aircraft for Ops Bamboo and thank 
you to all the pilots of the Nuri who had done a good job during my time in 
Ops Bamboo”.77 
Besides the challenging weather, the virgin jungle of Malaysia 
with the “…canopy  in general was anything from 150 to 300ft above the 
ground”,78 not only posed difficulties in determining a given location, it also 
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caused an obstruction during the process of winching up of the casualties. This 
was demonstrated when a Nuri was on a medevac mission involving two sick 
soldiers during Op Cahaya Bena 1 (4 July-16 August 1977) in Kroh area of 
operation. When the AQM was in the process of winching up the stretcher 
with a soldier in it and the other in the NATO Strop, the stretcher was stuck in 
between the branches of a tree. The AQM tried his best to free the stretcher but 
to no avail. The prolonged hovering caused the temperatures and the pressures 
(Ts&Ps) of the main gear box (MGB) to rise to the maximum allowable limit. 
The recommended immediate action was to execute a forward flight which 
would cool the MGB due to the downwash of the main rotor blades. Under 
this situation, the available options to the pilots were either to shear the cable 
which could seriously injure the soldiers or to face the risk of Ts&Ps exceeding 
the limits which could jeopardise the safety of the aircraft and crew. According 
to WO1 Gregory Charles (Retired), the AQM, “…Miraculously, both the 
medevac managed to climb down the tree despite being incapacitated to a 
certain extent,  still  being able to climb down a huge tree is amazing and a 
relief to the aircrew as well!!”.79 The Nuri flew off to cool the MGB before 
a second attempt to winch up the soldiers and the mission was carried out 
successfully.
In the 1960s’, Malaysia was facing threats from the communist 
insurgency and the Philippines over the latter’s claim over Sabah. The need 
to bolster its SF became more urgent with the withdrawal of the British forces 
in 1967. This withdrawal had Malaysia solely to shoulder the defence of 
its sovereignty against internal and external threats. Facing this reality, the 
government took cognisance the need of medium lift helicopters, Sikorsky 
S61A-4 Nuris. The introduction of the Nuris in 1968 coincided with the 
insurrection of the CPM insurgency in Peninsular Malaysia. The presence of 
these helicopters were crucial in providing rapid deployment of the SF and 
supplies to the area of operations in the virgin tropical rain forest in their search 
and destroy missions  against the CTs. As stated by Gen Tan Sri Ghazali Seth 
(Retired), the element of speed provided by the Nuri “…Over the jungle, one 
hour in a helicopter equalled at least five days on foot.”80This air mobility 
reduced the risk to the troops of being victims of booby traps planted by the 
enemies, thus reducing casualties. More importantly, casualties were speedily 
evacuated for medical attentions, the delay of which could affect the morale 
of the troops, the second principle of war.81 The importance of the Nuri as 
a morale booster was stressed by Gen Tan Sri Borhan Bin Ahmad (Retired) 
when he told his wounded commando that it was “…the Nuri that saved you. 
That’s the Nuri”.82
Their employment as a platform in providing air mobility to the SF 
had contributed to the success of the government in eliminating the CTs. The 
speedy deployment of the troops by the Nuris to the area of operations forced 
the CTs’ to be constantly on the move and they were no longer invincible 
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in their safe haven. The SF dominance over the CTs was highlighted by the 
Malaysian Army in that “…RMAF helicopters were the workhorses which 
provided tactical mobility for the Army in the fight against the CTs in remote 
and inaccessible areas”.83 However, in performing these roles, the Nuris 
became  the favourite targets of the CTs. These were demonstrated during 
the Op Gubir 11 and followed by Op Selamat Sawadee. In addition to these 
threats, the Nuri crew had to face the challenges of operating in mountainous 
area covered with virgin jungles which restricted its performance. 
Conclusion
The communist insurgency came to an end on 2 December 1989 with the 
signing of the Peace Agreement between Malaysia and CPM at Lee Garden 
Hotel, Hat Yai, Thailand.84The sterling performance of the Nuri undeniably 
had contributed to the laying of arms by the CPM as expressed by Gen Tan Sri 
Hashim Bin Mohd Ali, “…Nuri played a major role in expediting our effort 
in eliminating communist threats”.85This was achievable due to the dedication 
of the crew who were ready to face the challenges in ensuring missions were 
accomplished. The perseverance of the Nuri aircrew was aptly expressed by 
Brig Gen Dato’ Abdul Rahim Bin Abdul Rahman RMAF (Retired):86
 “…As tactical helicopter pilots, the well-being and comfort of the 
ground troops are of paramount importance. As such our hearts and 
minds must essentially be with them at all times. Our assurance that 
any combat casualty shall be taken out in the most speedy manner, 
to the best medical facilities available to guarantee timely medical 
attention, boosted their more tremendously. This responsibility shall 
be undertaken by us irrespective of rain or shine, day or night. Failure 
is never an option”.
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